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Thomas Bacon, Frank Norris’s history teacher, wrote 
that Norris recognized the power of individual will as well 
as the dominance of natural law. In McTeague, one of 
Norris's early novels, the power of natural force easily 
dominates the individual. In The Octopus, written over five 
years later, each character acts as he chooses, and Norris 
holds him responsible for the outcome of his behavior.
The inclusion of a greater degree of free will does not 
exclude The Octopus from the ranks of naturalistic works; 
Norris still adheres to many conventions of naturalism. In 
fact, his use of natural forces, which at times seem to sway 
the characters, often appears to rob them of their freedom 
to act. But the freedom remains, evident in the way 
characters learn how to correctly perceive the world they 
live in.
Norris is often accused of philosophical inconsistency 
in The Octopus, especially with regard to its ending. By 
exposing the inadequacy of an anti-social response, Norris 
reaffirms the need for social awareness, and above all, an 
acceptance of responsibility as a member of society.
THE PARADOX BETWEEN "SELF-SOVEREIGNTY" AND 
"UNIVERSAL LAW" IN THE OCTOPUS
Frank Norris employed elements of Zola's naturalism in
all his major works, most notably McTeague (1899), but by
the time he published The Octopus (1901), he modified his
intentions considerably. Norris wrote to I. F. Marcosson
that he planned to return to the "straight naturalism" of
McTeague  ^ to voice "an idea thats [sic] as big as all 
2
outdoors." Norris did not return to the literary theory 
that guided him in McTeague, however, instead he creates a 
different kind of naturalism that lacks the determinism and 
fatalism that characterize McTeague. The importance of the 
characters' personalities increases in The Octopus, as well 
as an urgency that they understand and interpret the real­
ities of their social and natural environments. In their 
relationships to the forces that summarily crushed McTeague 
and Trina, the main characters in The Octopus wield their 
strength in the form of individual will.
Norris compares the literary theories behind The 
Octopus and McTeague in the letter to Marcosson, declaring a 
return "definitely now to the style of MacT," and revealing 
a new-found certainty about his philosophical and literary 
ideology: "Now I think I know where I am at and what game I
play the best. The Wheat series will be straight naturalism
3
with all the guts I can get into it." Donald Pizer empha­
sizes the "style" rather than "naturalism" of McTeague and 
the link between McTeague and The Octopus, identifying the 
latter as a "return to the strength and depth of Vandover 
and McTeague" and as a representation of "a more balanced
2
4view of man's failings and glories."
Norris did indeed know "where he was at" in The Octopus, 
and, even if he wasn't smack in the middle of the natural­
istic court, he certainly stood within its boundaries. 
American naturalism is less easily defined than other 
literary movements, perhaps because its diverse proponents 
employ vastly different methods. Its critics disagree
dramatically, but most agree on several characteristics
5
identified by V. L. Parnngton. In American naturalism, an 
objective, frank author writes a story in which the 
character, usually a beefy, brainless worker or a neurotic, 
moody artist, is subjected to deterministic forces (which 
can be hereditary, environmental, natural, social, intan­
gible, mechanistic, indifferent, cruel, or unfathomable), 
that destroy him mercilessly.  ^ Malcolm Cowley identifies 
such other common attributes as dualism, rebellion, love of
7
the massive, and irony. Parts of McTeague and The Octopus 
correspond to these definitions, as well as to Lars 
Ahnebrink's summary of the contradictory elements of 
naturalism:
It is varied and full of inconsistencies? strong, 
ethical characters are contrasted with week, 
passive figures dominated by forces beyond their 
control? determinism is mingled with fatalism, 
pessimism with optimism, gealism with lyricism,
Tendenz with objectivity.
Finally, in defining naturalism, its relationship to 
realism and romanticism comes into question. Christopher 
Wilson considers naturalism "a synthesis of Romance and
3
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Realism." Most critics tend to choose one of these theories 
as more influencial to the naturalist. Frederick Hoffman 
sees the "mastery of fact" so common in realism to be a 
characteristic of naturalism.^ Ernest Marchand, who 
praises "the realism of McTeague," demonstrates the simi­
larity of realism to naturalism, stating that "realism 
becomes naturalism at the moment when it adopts a philosophy 
of materialistic determinism."** Nor does the naturalist
scorn romance, as Edwin Cady sees the realist, upon whom
12"the sensibility of the romancer had been lost," chooses
to do. Cady calls the naturalistic writer "a new romancer
13in dealing with character." And Norris himself admiringly
14dubs Zola "the very head of the Romanticists." Both 
sensibilities, Realism and Romanticism, figure prominently 
in Norris's naturalism.
In McTeague, as opposed to the romantic tendencies of 
The Octopus, Norris employs naturalism tinged with realism.
He reveals the characters' most secret feelings— Trina's 
awakening sexuality, McTeague's bewilderment in losing his 
dental practice, Zerkow's growing excitement about the gold 
dishes— in such a way as to render them impersonal and 
obvious. The author exposes private feelings so matter-of- 
factly that even the most private emotions lose their 
attraction. Trina and McTeague begin as average people who
are then "twisted from the ordinary . . . and flung headlong
15into the throes of a vast and terrible drama." Their 
demise results from bad luck, genetic predisposition, and
4social convention, in addition to the forces of nature. But
their own actions influence their fates very little, since
Norris endows neither with the moral capacity to create a
workable code of conduct. In The Octopus, Magnus and Dyke
also contend with chance, heredity, and social pressure, but
their respective personalities matter greatly. Dyke's lack
of care in business and his drinking (unlike McTeague, none
of Dyke's ancestors drank) cause him to lose his home and
eventually to turn to murder. Similarly, Magnus is held at
least partly responsible for all that happens to him.
Although one feels as sorry for Magnus and Dyke as for Trina
and McTeague, blame falls only on the former pair.
In The Octopus, romantic theory emerges triumphant over
realistic inclinations.^ Don Graham calls "the American
naturalistic novel . . .  a romance in which the adventurers
17never achieve clarity of illumination," which, in The
Octopus, some of the characters fail to do. Norris argues
for the worth of Romance in The Responsibilities of the
Novelist (1903):
But to Romance belongs the wide world for range, 
and the unplumed depths of the human heart, and 
the mystery of sex, and the problems of life, and 
the black, Y§searc i^e<^  penetralia of the soul of 
man . . . .
Norris opens The Octopus with a picture of the "wide world" 
of the San Joaquin Valley, and allows Romance to wander 
freely among the people who live there. He reveals the 
inner joy and heartaches, and makes known his characters' 
responses, whether suitable or inappropriate, to the circum­
5stances that beset them. Norris requires his characters to
contribute to the romance of The Octopus by creating them
with tortured hearts, repressed sexual longings and morally
weak souls worth healing. H. Willard Reninger notes that
Norris1s theory about how a character perceives in The
Responsibilities of the Novelist is put into practice in The
Octopus. Reninger emphasizes, as I do, the importance of
understanding the undercurrents of a character’s moral
environment: "The problem, then, [of understanding] resolves
itself to the question, 'What kind of eyes will you look
with?' One can see actuality, but one can only perceive 
19reality." In The Octopus, each character gets the oppor­
tunity to perceive reality without being subjected to the 
inexorable pull of external forces.
The Octopus reflects a basic paradox identified by 
Norris's history teacher, Thomas Bacon. Norris, he wrote, 
"knew two things: first, that the individual has self­
sovereignty; second, that the universe is run by law, a law 
which is absolutely certain, and which takes up into itself
and uses for its own ends the aberrations of the human 
20will." In The Octopus, Norris does battle with the
21paradox of free will and natural determinism. Nature, in 
Norris's mind, is moral and good in the end, and this theory 
is backed by the theology and philosophy of the time— led by 
LeConte, Fiske, Spencer— so naturalism as human subjection
to~-n a tu r a-l— l aws can be viewed as optimistic. This optimism
also coincides with the view that nature will not hurt man
6unless he rebels against it. The problem, then, seems to be 
that Norris is inconsistent in his optimistic naturalism.
In McTeague, the characters are "punished" even though they 
submit to nature's laws, i.e. to "loving" each other, and 
die miserably though they conform to biological and social 
laws. In The Octopus, Norris stresses over and over again 
that n^turLe_JLs._JI.indifferent to the human swarm" (p. 458) —  
that_.it doesn't matter if one submits or rebels— but then he 
asserts tha^.nature_JLs always working toward the good, as 
evidenced by the death of S. Behrman. I contend that there 
is no inconsistency in either novel, and that Norris essen­
tially changed his idea of "naturalism"— in so far as that 
definition holds— from the deterministic naturalism in 
McTeague to instructive, optimistic naturalism in The 
Octopus. In McTeague, American naturalism at its most 
cohesive combines natural and„spcial forces to present 
characters utterly without recourse against the blows^ of 
fate, and subsequently stripped of their .ev o l u t i o n a r y Jiuman 
due. Thus unable to balance the higher and lower elements 
of the human constitution, the characters in McTeague
succumb to their basest instincts— going backward, as Cowley 
22says — to make up a novel of scientific observation, and 
not even an objective one at that, since the blamelessness 
of the characters elicits pity. This is "naturalism" in the 
style of pessimistic, materialistic determinism, and Norris 
develops away from that pessimism in later works such as The 
Octopus.
7In The Octopus, Norris intentionally shows that the 
determinism of his earlier works no longer suffices. In 
repudiating pessimistic naturalism, albeit in his charac­
teristically repetitive and melodramatic way, Norris in The 
Octopus does a deliberate about-face from the alternative- 
lessness of the characters in McTeague. Christopher Wilson, 
in evaluating the success of an American naturalistic 
literary tradition, identifies the need for the American 
naturalist to teach a lesson, and to do so positively:
For all its apparent realism, Progressive-era 
naturalism often denigrated accuracy in favor of 
mere convincingness; for all its apparent 
determinism, naturalism reflected positive think­
ing, a triumph of the will.
In The Octopus, each character*s will defeats forces that
McTeague and Trina could not even have identified, much less
rebelled against.
In contrast to Donald Pizer's statement that The
Octopus "is more a novel about man’s relationship to nature
24than a story of man as a social being," The Octopus,
really does have a great deal to do with man’s place in
society and his individual capacity for proper behavior.
The characters in The Octopus divide easily into those who
accept responsibility for their actions, and those who.,~~with
Norris’s help,^ ^.ame^narfeu-jja^or^man-made forces. Walter
Fuller Taylor identifies the conflict Norris creates between
human will and determinism in The Octopus:
For, on the one hand, he interprets his story at 
times by a philosophy of free will, according to 
which life is a moral experience, and man a being 
of importance; and, on the' other hand, he inter-
8prets his story at other times by an optimistic 
determinism, according to which life is an amoral 
experience, and the individual man of ng^importance 
in comparison to the total life-scheme.
I hope to show that Norris means life to be a moral experi­
ence for which the individual is responsible, even though he 
sometimes allows external agencies to creep in and attempt a 
takeover. The conflict between free will and fate deepens 
as Norris tries to plumb the depths of the human heart, 
unravel the mystery of sex, and solve the problems of life 
while still clinging to elements of naturalism. Natural 
laws have some effect, but the majority of the action 
involves man acting within initially unfamiliar social 
systems to which he reacts in widely varying ways.
At issue here is not the fact that all characters have 
responsibility; they do to some degree, as Richard Davison 
states:
Man is responsible for combatting evil and moving 
toward the good. The railroad and the wheat are 
neither responsible nor irresistible as mere 
forces. It is man’s use of these forces that 
results in evil or good. Men bribe railroad 
commissioners and exploit the land. Neither 
tenant farmers no^gailroad presidents are immune 
to responsibility.
Were this the case in The Octopus— that all characters
clearly deserve blame for their actions, and that they and
their critics recognize their guilt— then, Norris would not
include the sweeping forces that affect his characters so
much that their ability to govern themselves appears to
fail. One's level of responsibility matters in The Octopus.
Otherwise, Magnus would not be seized by an undefined
9force— a "mesh" of confusion (p. 206)— that reduces his 
culpability. Mrs. Derrick's fortitude would not be compro­
mised by comparisons to "the feather caught in the whirl­
wind" (p. 199). Dyke, who ends an apparent victim of the 
railroad, could simply put tail between legs and not even 
try to keep his head above water until one of "those 
millions of tentacles suddenly reaches up from below"
(p. 249) to choke him. No need to stop at a kiss in the 
dairy cellar? Annixter might as well satisfy his lust on the 
spot, thus saving himself the anguish of self-inspection.
But he has the duty to behave humanly, not to give in to 
instincts. Similarly, such contagious responsibility 
prohibits Vanamee and Presley from escaping so guiltlessly. 
Norris extends a generous share of accountability to each 
character, but employs as well powerful external forces that 
weaker .characters are glad to blame their failures ..upon.
Different aspects of reality exist in the world of The 
Octopus. Perceiving one's particular world correctly, 
whether in moral, artistic, or spiritual terms, gains 
unprecedented importance. Early in the novel, Norris 
defines perception, the key to awareness, when he describes 
Annixter's first view of Magnus's plowing team:
Annixter's eyes made out a blue [sic] on the 
horizon to the northward? the blue concentrated 
itself to a speck? the speck grew by steady 
degrees to a spot, slowly moving, a note of dull 
color, barely darker than the land . . . .  As the 
spot grew larger, it resolved itself into constit­
uents, . . . its shape grew irregular, fragmen­
tary . . . .  The click and clink of metal work 
was incessant . . . the column approached nearer?
10
was close at hand . . . .  The noises mingled to a 
subdued uproar, a bewildered confusion, the impact 
of innumerable hoofs was a veritable rumble . . . 
machine succeeding machine . . .; fecundating the
living soil? implanting deep in the dark womb of 
the earth the germ of life, the sustenance of a 
whole world, the food of an entire people.
(pp. 127-8)
This early passage sets the tone for the way Norris's
27characters discover reality. Not only do details become 
apparent by "slowly moving" "steady degrees," but those 
details are at best "fragmentary," eliciting "a bewildered 
confusion" as an initial response.
Norris directs his characters by carefully doling out 
events, ideas, and circumstances. The good that could 
result— an honest deal, an ideal love, a calmer spirit, a 
higher understanding— must, just like the "germ of life," 
first make its way through the "subdued uproar" that consti­
tutes each person's confused existence. Unlike in McTeague, 
most experiences are viewed in one all-encompassing glimpse? 
in The Octopus, characters come to know what is happening to 
them in measurable degrees. Scenes in McTeague are like 
photographs: McTeague looking at Polk Street, a yielding
Trina in the clutches of her lustful suitor, Zerkow along 
the water's edge with his bag of junk. In The Octopus, 
events occur with cinema-like motion. Annixter's transfor­
mation, Magnus's capitulation, Dyke's criminal behavior come 
to mind as scenes with many parts, not as a single event. 
Norris still employs sweeping natural forces that crush men, 
and powerful instincts that compel characters to revert to
11
animalistic behavior, but the forces and instincts are now 
tempered by each character’s growing responsibility to 
understand life and act accordingly.
In Magnus Derrick, Norris creates a character with 
definite strengths and weaknesses, a man aware of his 
potential, but careless enough to ruin what he might accom­
plish. By placing him within the context of a rigidly moral 
worldview, Norris forces certain restrictions upon him— that 
is, Magnus must conform to the moral standards he sets for 
himself. Yet merely conforming to his chosen creed does not 
necessarily insure success, as NQrris demonstrates in 
drawing Magnus's character. Indications that Magnus has 
failed to achieve great success crop up throughout the early 
stages of Norris's characterization. Magnus falls short of 
business and political aspirations (p. 50)? in one of his 
initial business attempts, for example, "he had sold out his 
interest at a small profit— just in time to miss his chance 
of becoming a multimillionaire" (p. 50). He runs his ranch 
by luck rather than by science, deeming fertilization and 
fallow fields "niggardly, Hebraic, ungenerous" (p. 52).
Eager to claim sole credit for his fortune, he unwisely 
discharges all his tenants. He continues to make rapid 
decisions and commit rash acts, even though in the past such 
behavior has led to financial losses, or at the very least 
missed fortunes. His suggestion to the ranchers that if "we 
act quickly, there may be a chance" (p. 79) shows how little 
he has learned from his mistakes.
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Magnus, all too aware of his unrealized ambitions, sees 
this last gamble for power as tantamount to "his ambition at 
length gratified, his career, once apparently brought to 
naught, completed? success a palpable achievement" (p. 133). 
In addition to listing Magnus's disappointments in life, 
Norris sets the stage for his slow demise by stressing two 
of his apparently antithetical personality traits.
Magnus's love of honesty and his reliance on luck 
create a paradox: the honest approach prohibits his leading
the League of ranchers who will bribe commissioners in order 
to lower rates? but in addition to the excitement of a 
gamble, membership in the League seems at the time the only 
hope for economic dominance. Magnus values honesty as much 
as he loves the thrill of the gamble. These two qualities 
are constantly at war with each other in a fight to achieve 
a similar goal— to be the leader of other men. The desire 
to hazard everything on the hope of colossal returns"
(p. 51) crops up each time Magnus questions the wisdom of 
assenting to the other ranchers' "scheme of bribery" (p. 80). 
His initial response to the proposal shows his pleasure at 
being "looked to . . .  as the natural leader, their chief, 
who was to bring them out from the abominable trouble"
(p. 87). References by others to his commanding nature 
occur throughout the text (pp. 132, 172, 177, 192). He sees 
himself as "leader at last, king of his fellows" (p. 227) 
when he dreams of the possibility of sending wheat to China. 
Driven by the need to command, and despite "his championship
13
of justice and truth, his respect for law, Magnus remained 
the gambler, willing to play for colossal stakes, to hazard 
a fortune on the chance of winning a million" (p. 211). 
Previously, he commanded respect through honesty; now, his 
"honesty, rectitude, uncompromising integrity [prevail] for 
the last time against the devious maneuvering, the evil 
communications, the rotten expediency of a corrupted insti­
tution" (p. 85) and then falter.
Magnus succumbs to evil not from a predilection to 
follow the crowd, or from natural outside forces, but from a 
personal decision he makes in a state of considerable 
agitation. When Magnus's desires conflict, his grasp on the 
realities at hand dim. The pressures to lead, to take 
chances, and to be honest emerge from within his own person­
ality. These are qualities he develops during his lifetime, 
each desire so dominant that it clouds Magnus's decision­
making powers. Critic Warren French attributes Magnus's 
failure directly to his (and Shelgrim's) inability to 
recognize their own imperfection, explaining that their 
"offense was not that they deliberately did wrong but that 
because of adolescent self-infatuation, they failed to
2 8perceive the limitations of their own powerful gifts."
Early in the conflict he firmly rejects being "party to a 
scheme of avowed bribery and corruption" (p. 81), but 
decides to condone discussion of it anyway because Harran, 
whom Magnus is "so accustomed . . .  to listening to" (p. 81) 
expresses interest. Harran's interest causes the initial
14
confusion, as Magnus, so used to taking Harran's advice, 
allows his firmly held, continually reinforced honesty to 
diminish slightly.
Magnus faces a second paroxysm of confusion when he 
weighs his chance to succeed against the possibility that he 
might damage his reputation. He torments himself night and 
day in contemplation of the alternatives: "his cherished,
f
life-long integrity, the unstained purity of his principles?
At this late date were they to be sacrificed? . . . And yet
. . . to neglect his chance meant failure" (p. 134). Here
Magnus faces a moral choice. William Vance considers
Derrick ill-equipped for the trials Norris assigns him,
possessing a "specific flaw" that forces upon him a "dilemma
29. . . [that] is fully tragic." But Vance fails to recog­
nize that the gambling side of Magnus is not necessarily a 
flaw but a commensurate part, indispensable to the character 
Norris has created, and, with regard to his success So
far— being the dominant economic and social magnate in his
30area— generally an advantage. If Magnus does have a 
"flaw," it is his inability to recognize that he must at all 
costs conform to the standards on which he has grounded his 
reputation.
Norris does not require perfection in his characters; 
as I will demonstrate later, Annixter makes several grave 
mistakes, yet reconciles them when he realizes he is wrong. 
Similarly, Magnus, as Annixter loudly proclaims, is a fool 
for "giving his tenants the bounce, and working Los Muertos
15
himself" (p. 26), but he still ends up with a "bonanza" crop
31(p. 433) for the railroad to seize. In these cases of
minor human error, Norris does not intrude with external
forces that seem to compel Annixter or Magnus to a certain 
32action. Soon after Magnus agrees to consider the scheme
of bribery his wife begs him for a promise to stay out of
the whole business, which he cannot give. Using phrasing to
implicate Magnus as a pawn of fate, Norris describes his
inner turmoil:
Already he was entangled, already his foot was 
caught in the mesh that was being spun. Sharply 
he recoiled. Again all his instincts of honesty 
revolted. No, whatever happened, he would 
preserve his integrity. (p. 135)
Eventually Magnus agrees to lead the League amidst "a vast
thunder of savage jubilation" (p. 200), but nothing and no
one forces him to sign. Magnus has to choose between what
is right and wrong in a moral context. There will be
unpleasant repercussions if he sticks by what is right, but
if he reflected more deeply on that ingrained honesty on
which he so depends, and recognized that he has to operate
within the laws of his self-defined morality, then he could
have saved himself. When Norris disturbs Magnus's moral
decision with controlling forces, it serves as a reminder of
how easy it is to blame anything besides ourselves. Norris
fully recognizes Magnus's guilt, and his moral weakness. He
intrudes a second time with the powerful "mesh" that appears
to be determinism, but really just comes from conflict with
Magnus's mind:
16
He was hopelessly caught in the mesh. Wrong 
seemed indissolubly knitted into the texture of 
right. He was blinded, dizzied, overwhelmed, 
caught in the current of events, and hurried along 
he knew not where. He resigned himself. (p. 206)
Clearly, Magnus weaves his own mesh, and personally unleashes
the current of events that engulfs him.
When Magnus resigns himself to corruption, his physical
condition reflects his mental turmoil. Increasingly unaware,
he has "aged suddenly" (p. 2 80), and trembling and stopped,
begins to "consult his lieutenants . . . distrusting his own
opinions" (p. 281). His last confrontation with reality
occurs in a theatre dressing room, where he sits, "an old
man, broken, discarded, discredited, and abandoned" (p. 394),
fully aware that "he had failed" (p. 393). For all the
pathos of his demise, Magnus himself decided upon the course
that brought him to this point; he is "by his own hand,
undermined" (p. 393). In short, conflict exists not between
Magnus and fate, but between facets of Magnus*s personality.
A divergence in method between The Octopus and McTeague
appears in comparing Magnus’s degeneration to those of
Zerkow in McTeague and Dyke in The Octopus. Zerkow exhibits
an ambition similar to Magnus's: he seizes upon a fantastic
vision of great wealth, in the form of gold dishes, and
gears his activities exclusively toward realizing that end.
He will not accept the impossibility of his dream, but
becomes lost and insane instead. Similarly, Magnus doggedly
pursues a goal of wealth by less-than-honorable means, and
ends an insane man. The difference lies in the decision
17
Magnus makes and the period of guilt he experiences after he
33realizes his mistake. Magnus consciously decides upon 
pursuing his goal because "to seize it meant achievement, 
fame, influence, prestige, possibly great wealth" (p. 134). 
By his own strength of will, Magnus maps out a course he 
feels will be successful. Zerkow has no such goal, being 
motivated instead by a base, unreasoning greed that even­
tually overpowers what little mental faculty he possesses.
By dint of repetition, "he comes to believe Mariafs story 
infallibly. He was immovably persuaded . . . .  In his 
perverted mind, the hallucination has developed still 
further" (p. 187). Zerkow never recognizes his foolishness. 
When he dies, "clutched in both his hands was a sack full of 
old rusty pans, tin dishes" (p. 247). Magnus also proceeds 
to oblivion? though he lives on, it is with the painful 
"consciousness of lost self-respect, the knowledge of a 
prestige vanishing, a dignity impaired" (p. 323). Magnus 
suffers shame for his actions before he becomes a "shambling, 
stooping, trembling old man" (p. 396). Zerkow simply 
suffers. Magnus is his own victim, because he chooses his 
poison. Zerkow cannot help himself.
Dyke’s misfortunes illuminate the responsibility which 
falls on particular characters. He may lack a good mind for 
business, but Norris endows him with enough horse sense to 
know that he has to play by the rules. Vance, assuming that 
Norris has failed to give Dyke adequate abilities, sees him 
as "so clearly intended as an illustration of the minimal
18
'struggle for survival' . . . that the philosophical dogmas
of naturalism begin to control both the reactions and the
ensuing events entirely apart from any question of proba- 
34bility." In so pigeonholing Dyke, Vance fails to take 
into account the opportunities Dyke ignores that could have 
prevented his ruin, and the circumstances that lead up to 
his eventual degeneration. By failing to determine the rate 
of hops, Dyke lets himself in for the disaster he acknowl­
edges might result. When Harran reminds him "to have a 
clear understanding with the railroad about the rate"
(p. 57), Dyke agrees, "I had better be sure of that" (p. 57). 
Yet, only several days later, after he has already farmed 
his land for hops, does Dyke finally check "to make sure 
what your rates on hops are" (p. 143). He feels nervous at 
having waited so long and begins "to blame himself that he 
has not long before determined definitely what the railroad 
would charge" (p. 143). Dyke has enough brains to know that 
the rate must stay the same in order for him to make a 
profit.
Dyke is ready to accept blame after his initial ruin, 
reconciling his loss with the earlier statement that "he was 
not much of a business man; that he managed carelessly"
(p. 143), but then "his tardy rage flames up" (p. 249), and 
he begins to think "By God, no, it was not his fault? [that] 
he had made no mistake" (p. 249). By this time, though, 
Dyke's culpability has been established. Even though he 
evokes sympathy, even though "the insatiate greed of the
19
monster"— the cruel railroad Norris inserts as a scape­
goat— has contributed to Dyke's misfortune (p. 249), he 
still has made his own decision to "make money" (p. 243) 
from hops. The subsequent scenes involving Dyke conform 
quite closely to Norris's naturalistic experiments, as the 
ruined Dyke turns to drink and violent crime, and eventually 
gains the "instinct of pursuit" (p. 280) that the hunted 
McTeague also finds as he flees into the desert, but the 
unfortunate consequences do not invalidate Dyke's initial 
freedom. Unlike McTeague, Dyke had other options; he could 
have asked for help, farmed on a smaller scale, waited 
another year, or even humbled himself enough to ask for his 
job back since he was able to swallow his pride enough to 
borrow money from the railroad.
Until they become mentally infirm, Dyke and Magnus take 
responsibility for their actions, but the natural forces so 
prevalent in McTeague still act upon them. Norris requires 
that all characters reckon with the major forces in the 
book, the wheat and the railroad. Magnus regards the wheat 
as nothing more than a means to make money; he is the type 
of rancher who "had no love for their land, but to get all 
there was out of the land, to squeeze it dry, to exhaust it" 
(p. 212). Unlike the other major characters, he never 
speaks of the wheat as a force that affects him, but rather 
as a profit producing body that he controls. His reaction 
to Cedarquist's proposition typifies his attitude toward the 
wheat in general. Magnus thinks that people should manipu-
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late the wheat, rather than be influenced by it:
The torrent of wheat was to be diverted, flowing 
back upon itself in a sudden, colossal eddy, 
stranding the middleman, the entrepreneur, the 
elevator and mixing house men . . . .  He saw the 
farmer suddenly emancipated, the world's food no 
longer at the mercy of the speculator, thousands 
upon thousands of men set free of the grip of 
trust and ring and monopoly. (p. 226)
Magnus, certain that he and his fellow ranchers can them­
selves cause the wheat "to be diverted" (p. 226), never 
considers the wheat an irrepressible force. He anticipates 
freeing the farmer from the hold of "the speculator . . .
the grip of trust and ring and monopoly" (p. 226). In 
Magnus's last reference to the wheat before hearing of the 
court defeat, he sees his (emphasis mine) wheat . . .
bursting upon Asia" (p. 227). There is no "terrible drama
35that works itself out," as Norris boldly claims drama must 
in naturalistic fiction; on the contrary, in Magnus one 
finds a character bent on making the drama of life work for 
himself.
Magnus is convinced that he exerts control over the 
railroad. Such confidence is not unusual in characters in 
naturalistic novels, who brazenly challenge external forces 
only to be crushed mercilessly by them. Magnus does not 
control the road, but neither does it destroy him as an 
impersonal force? Norris carefully develops Magnus's char­
acter as the culprit, not the blind force of the machine. 
Although he devotes little time to introspective delib­
eration about it, Magnus's ideal view places Shelgrim in 
balance with a theoretically honest Railroad Commission.
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The railroad lacks its usual inscrutability when seen
through Magnus's eyes, who cautions that "it is to the
Railroad Commission that the people of the state must look
for relief . . . .  Once elect commissioners who would be
loyal to the people, and the whole system of excessive rates
falls to the ground" (p. 79). Men control the railroad, and
since men can also control other men, Magnus assumes he has
the problem licked.
Magnus, the other ranchers, and of course the railroad
men all have a voice in the distribution of the wheat.
Prostrated not by the force of the wheat but by the
self-created force of their own stupidity, carelessness and
greed, they react with righteous indignation when their own
lack of expertise prohibits managing the two cooperating
forces. Joseph McElrath explains the foolish behavior that
brings the ranchers to an unfortunate, but plausible, ruin:
The irony is that Magnus, the time-tested gambler 
who should have known better, accepted the hand 
craftily dealt by the railroad without understand­
ing the nature of the game— its spoken and unspoken 
rules . . . .  The ranchers greedily and blindly 
rushed in where competent capitalists would neve^ 
tread. They voluntarily ran the gambler's risk.
The "voluntary" actions of the ranchers burden them with the
responsibility of being able to choose. Natural forces
little influence them.
Although his characters do accept blame or credit for
the results of their behavior, Norris does not completely
have done with FORCE. In Mrs. Derrick's character, Norris's
Spencerian ideology rears its persistent head. Magnus's
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wife, though strong enough to have withstood the "droning, 
heartbreaking routine of the class and music room" (p. 47), 
and self-sacrificing enough to return to such odious work, 
lacks control over her life. Norris describes her as 
industrious but relatively unambitious: "by disposition she
was retiring? she easily obliterated herself. She was not 
made for the harshnesses of the world" (p. 47). She cher­
ishes but one ambition— to go to Italy— yet she takes no 
action toward that goal save marrying Magnus and "following 
his fortunes" (p. 47). Her lack of initiative might be 
attributed to her sex, but one look at Hilma's robust vigor 
eliminates femininity as the sole reason behind her inertia. 
Yet, when Magnus collapses into senility, Mrs. Derrick, 
"listless, apathetic and calm with the calmness of a woman 
who knows she can suffer no further," goes back to work 
because her husband "can hardly take care of himself, to say 
nothing of me" (p. 437) , demonstrating a previously unseen 
aspect of her personality— the ability to take charge when 
necessary.
Besides her antithetical personality, Mrs. Derrick 
serves a second function with regard to the symbol of the 
wheat. As the only character, except perhaps S. Behrman at 
the very end, to regard the wheat as evil, and the first 
character to describe her feeling about this powerful force, 
she serves to dispel the opinion that the wheat represents 
only good. Her view bypasses the enthrallment Vanamee and 
Annixter feel when they link fulfillment in love with "the
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eternal green life of the growing wheat bursting its bonds"
(p. 277). Her thoughts are closer to Presley's idea at the
end that the wheat is "indifferent to the human swarm"
37(p. 458.
By examining Mrs. Derrick's reaction to the surrounding 
wheat, the reader perceives that Norris diverges from the 
naturalism of McTeague. Initially, Annie thinks the wheat 
an unmercifully evil force, as it can be— but only when men 
use it so, not of its own accord. But, "To her mind there 
was something inordinate about it all, something almost 
unnatural. The direct brutality of the wheat . . . stunned
her a little" (p. 48). Mrs. Derrick finds the wheat lewd 
and frightening, as "indecent [as] . . . the unconscious
nakedness of a sprawling primordial Titan" (p. 48). She 
also recoils from what she senses to be a deliberate harsh­
ness toward people in the "direct brutality" of the wheat. 
She later modifies her opinion slightly about the relation­
ship between man and nature:
She recognized the colossal indifference of 
nature, not hostile, even kindly and friendly, so 
long as the human ant swarm was submissive, 
working with it, hurrying along at its side in the 
mysterious march of the centuries. Let however, 
the insect rebel, . . . and at once it became 
relentless, a gigantic engine, a vast power, huge, 
terrible . . . .  (p. 130)
Forces like the wheat do not take pitiless vengeance on a
man when he tries to alter the system in The Octopus. They
are much too impersonal and ambivalent to human behavior to
affect man in a naturalistic way. In McTeague, nature
reacts personally and integrally? it doesn't wait for human
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rebellion before it strikes. The mountains envelop McTeague
at the end without his disobedience, "their immensity, their
enormous power, crude and blind, reflecting themselves in
his own nature, huge, strong, brutal in its simplicity"
(p. 298), Nature turns vicious without provocation as
McTeague then enters an "awful sink of alkali [that] was
openly and unreservedly iniquitous and malignant (p. 327).
Nature in McTeague brutalizes man regardless of his actions;
in The Octopus, at least man must first rebel. In The
Octopus, Norris moves away from an overtly hostile natural
world. Although Norris picks up a McTeague-like thread in
The Octopus, especially in the character of Mrs. Derrick,
who, like McTeague, exhibits that utter helplessness before
the force of nature, he rejects the premise of McTeague that
dictates complete compliance with natural forces and with
chance. At the end Annie is so strong and resilient and
seems so aware of the possibilities they had and lost that
she proves human independence. She knew that Magnus’s
capitulation would mean ruin, but her actions could not
change Magnus's. Even though Norris features natural forces
as part of Mrs. Derrick's motivations, the awareness he
gives her seems to contradict the determinism so reminiscent 
3 8of McTeague.
The naturalistic theories that only slightly alter The 
Octopus rigidly govern the minds and bodies of the charac­
ters in McTeague. Donald Pizer describes McTeague and Trina 
as essentially powerless to direct their lives, since, being
25
"caught up by drives and instincts beyond their control or
39comprehension, they mate by chance rather than by will."
Norris stresses this point, too:
Yet neither of them was to blame. From the first 
they had not sought each other. Chance had 
brought them face to face, and mysterious instincts 
as ungovernable as the winds of heaven were at 
work knitting their lives together. Neither of 
them had asked that this thing should be, that 
their destinies, their very souls, should be the 
sport of chance . . . .  But they were allowed no 
voice in the matter. (p. 74)
Such lack of control represents the general naturalistic
tone of McTeague. Instinct couples behavior with inner,
unlearned motivation; innate urges replace thoughts.
McTeague and Trina must settle for the mystery of a world
they cannot hope to affect. No differences between mind and
body exist here; when McTeague moves "slowly, ponderously,"
his mind "was as his body, heavy, slow to act, sluggish"
(p. 7). McTeague falls victim to "mysterious instincts";
Magnus's strong will allows him to conquer instinct and plan
out his actions, however faulty they turn out to be.
Annixter exhibits a lack of awareness very similar to
Mr. and Mrs. Derrick's, but he realizes the truth before he
loses that which is most important to him. Magnus's greatest
desire is to achieve prominence through political power; he
commits wrong as a consequence. Annixter grasps the reality
of most situations, but fumbles about within the context of
romantic love. Before he can react properly to the ideal
love he and Hilma will eventually share, he drifts from
unbridled lust to vague desire. Ultimately he comprehends
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the true emotion of all-embracing love. Norris again places 
a character within a moral world, and expects him to behave 
properly, but initially, Annixter is not equipped to do so. 
He roughly tries to kiss Hilma at first, and then to make 
her his mistress, two unacceptable acts in the moral world 
that love for Hilma eventually enables him to occupy.
Annixter changes in two converging ways. As his desire 
for Hilma sharpens, his capacity to love widens as well. 
Annixter*s pre-Hilma personality is "rough almost to 
insolence" (p. 24); he is thoroughly contemptuous of others' 
needs and opinions. His overall greed, exhibited in his 
conversation with Ruggles, makes him appear just as 
profit-hungry as Shelgrim: "I can't take advantage of that
rise in value so long as you won't Sell . . . .  You're 
blocking me" (p. 141). Well aware of the reality of the 
business world, Annixter's knowledge does not help him 
understand Hilma. He loses all his brashness when near her: 
he is "smitten dumb as soon as she entered the room, gluing 
his eyes upon his plate, his elbows close to his side, 
awkward, clumsy, overwhelmed with constraint" (p. 62). This 
initial infatuation, obviously of a physical nature— he 
ogles "the sweet feminine amplitude of her breast" (p. 65)—  
manifests itself in three episodes of selfish conduct. He 
exhibits particularly irrational behavior when he tells 
Delaney "to pack off, you understand, and do it lively"
(p. 70). His two trespasses against Hilma, the kiss and the 
offer to take her as his mistress, represent a completely
27
false understanding and provoke the severest reaction from 
her. Only then does Annixter start to think.
Annixter*s transformation entails the lessening of the 
lustful desire so antithetical to Hilma*s morality. Since 
he "at one time had known perfectly well what he wanted"
(p. 256), his realization that now "the goal of his desires 
had become vague" (p. 256) torments him into action. Forced 
to abandon his previous notion that "marriage was a form­
less, far-distant abstraction" (p. 258), Annixter attains 
understanding through the power of his own reason. Hilma, 
once someone with whom "he imagined an affair" (p. 63), 
becomes "an ever-present reality" (p. 258). The events of 
the year have brought him to such a high degree of altruistic 
ripeness that he finally desires "to make someone happy"
(p. 258). He comes to this understanding not by accident or 
mandate, but because, as Charles Child Walcutt writes, he
possesses certain "*spiritual elements' that defy explana-
40tion in terms of heredity and environment." He decides 
that he wants to be a part of her world, a world of morality 
that transcends his own. Even Annixter himself attributes 
his metamorphosis to a person, not a force? he changes 
"because of Hilma, and because we cared for each other"
(p. 330).41
Although forces do not determine Annixter*s new percep­
tion, Norris still imposes them on his story. When he 
affirms Annixter*s resolution to give himself to Hilma, he 
links the impetus of that burst of life with the force
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behind the wheat. The wheat burst forth from the ground at
the same time Annixter realizes that he loves Hilma:
Once more the Titan, benignant, calm, stirred and 
woke, and the morning abruptly blazed into glory 
upon the spectacle of a man whose heart leaped 
exuberant with the love of a woman, and an exulting 
earth gleaming transcendent with the radiant 
magnificence of an inviolable pledge. A0
(p. 260)
But one can hardly take comfort in the words that precede 
this benediction: "the earth, the loyal mother, who never
failed, who never disappointed, was keeping her faith"
(p. 260). Like as not, the harvest will fail and the "force 
of the world" leave millions far from revivified. Even at 
the beginning of the book, mother earth has disappointed, 
Magnus "having raised no crop to speak of for two years"
(p. 27) because of dry conditions. Annixter's joy, when 
viewed this way, takes on a temporary, uncertain quality 
foreign to the love he has achieved. Norris's intrusion 
might be best explained by his characteristically bad 
writing in describing scenes of great joy. The wheat 
analogy works to an extent, but advocates of its natural­
istic force will find that the correspondence between its 
force and Annixter's love break down if taken too literally.
Annixter's "transformation" really just means that he 
learns and willingly accepts a new standard of behavior.
This knowledge comes gradually. Annixter does not change in 
one night; Hilma's loving presence has brought him step by 
step toward the one night when he finally realizes how 
changed he has become. Thus, unlike the wheat field
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"unbroken by a single green shoot" (p. 260), Annixter's mind
43and heart have indeed been pricked. Not only has the seed 
been planted "in that rugged composition, confused, dark, 
harsh" (p. 258), it has begun to germinate long before this 
moment. Annixter shows remorse over the attempt to kiss 
Hilma, telling her "I want to be friends with you. I made a 
bad mistake," and begging her to "not think that I am a 
galoot and a mucker [and] . . .  be friends with me"
(p. 149). In the barn before Delaney, Annixter looks into 
Hilma's eyes and "from that moment on, . . . knew that Hilma 
cared" (p. 184). Annixter responds to the concern reflected 
in her eyes with a yearning less sexual than he previously 
demonstrated. An even kinder, if still unenlightened, 
Annixter promises his trusting lady, "I'll take care of you" 
(P- 236), only to find himself, after insulting her, alone 
by the creek. After these events, Annixter's mind begins to 
expand.
How men deal with the external forces that act upon 
them depend on personality traits developed consciously.
The wheat itself acts more as a catalyst for Annixter's 
enlightenment than as a deterministic natural force. The 
success of his love affair with Hilma results largely from 
the preceding changes in Annixter's personality. No trans­
formation of this sort appears in McTeague. Mr. Grannis and 
Miss Baker also find true love, but only after two years of 
imagined courtship. They have ignored the truth, refusing 
to cling to false hope, but, nevertheless, their love has
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grown. They finally declare their love when Miss Baker
feels compelled to go to Mr. Grannis because "it seemed to
her that he was wanting her" (p. 250). She moves at the
appointed time, almost like an automaton; she requires no
thought or reason, but goes as if predetermined. As William
Dillingham stresses, "It is the same 'malicious fate' that
destroys the others in the book that also brings them 
44together." They discover then that what they imagined 
false for so long was actually a reality. What seemed until 
this moment to be fancy has all along been fact. They find 
happiness as if it had been decreed.
Characters in The Octopus prefer to cling to their 
personal visions rather than face reality. Until forced by 
circumstances, they choose not to confront the truth.
Magnus faces ruin and collapses before he understands. His 
wife shares the failure she anticipated, but did not know 
how to prevent. Annixter fears the permanent loss of Hilma 
before he recognizes the love in his heart. Dyke loses all 
his money after learning too late to be careful in business. 
Each of these characters, unlike those in McTeague who never 
have to know reality or act responsibly, either has to 
change or face his come-uppance. But they are at least 
capable of change. Two other major characters in The 
Octopus, also given full responsibility for their actions, 
never undergo permanent improvement or decay, existing 
instead in a social vacuum, ignorant of anyone's needs but 
their own. Both Vanamee and Presley exhibit a frightening
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unawareness of the world around them. Although Norris 
flatteringly describes them as "both out of tune with their 
world, dreamers, . . . groping and baffled amid the perplex­
ing obscurity of the delusion" (p. 156), their blindness 
hardly merits praise. Vanamee and Presley, along with 
Shelgrim, voice the conclusion of The Octopus, but because 
they lack the awareness Norris demands, they profess a false 
creed.
Norris describes Vanamee as "a young seer, . . .  a 
half-inspired shepherd of the Hebraic legends, a dweller in 
the wilderness, gifted with strange powers" (p. 154, also 
pp. 29, 99, 446). He, of all the characters, seems to be 
least influenced by hostile natural forces, simply because 
he lives harmoniously with them. Endowed with the ability 
to noiselessly call people to him at will, and so in tune 
with nature that he can feel "a vibration merely, faint, 
elusive, impossible of definition, a minute notch in the 
fine keen edge of stillness" (p. 272), Vanamee also embodies 
the self-sovereign man. But closeness to nature does not 
constitute an awareness of all of reality? Vanamee lacks 
knowledge of the social and moral environment that surrounds 
him. Other characters misjudge situations, but eventually 
they either see the falsehood and recant, or they deterio­
rate. Vanamee does neither, preferring the falsehood over 
the truth. He even begins the quest for Angele by 
confessing that "He was ready to be deluded? craved the 
hallucination? begged pitifully for the illusion" (p. 110)?
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in accepting her daughter he satisfies his craving at the
expense of truth.
Norris demands in The Responsibilities of the Novelist
that in romantic fiction an author must above all "create a
45truthful impression." He skillfully prepares us for the
Vanamee sections, thus suspending our disbelief that such
supernatural occurrences are possible in the story. Norris
sacrifices, as Christopher Wilson writes, the "real life" he
admires, satisfying instead "a nascent consumer culture’s
fascination for 'image* over reality, for credibility over
46truth— not for sincerity, but only what looks like it."
Vanamee*s special powers, though not real in the strict
sense of the word, still emerge as quite valid in the
context of The Octopus. His ability to call someone to him
against her will serves as evidence of Vanamee's capacity
for self-determination; his ability to sense her approach
47outlines his natural sensitivity. These two qualities are 
as much a part of Vanamee's personality as Magnus's need to 
take chances and be honest. Such extraordinary powers 
initially seem as deterministic as the sexual instinct in 
McTeague, but they involve much more than an involuntary, 
uncomprehended response. Although Vanamee "can't tell 
exactly how" these powers work, he confidently claims, "we 
don't understand these things yet" (p. 30), implying that 
not only are they explainable, but that eventually we will 
understand them. Vanamee is quite certain at times that "I 
am stronger than death, and that if I only knew how to use
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the strength of my will, concentrate on my power of 
thought— " (p. 109), he could bring Angele back. He 
attributes to himself his success or failure in calling 
someone, not to the force behind the power. When he can't 
immediately reach Angele, "at first he thought this was 
because he had allowed his mind to go slack" (p. 113). 
Vanamee "allows" his will to falter and commands his powers 
to obey: Norris makes it very clear that Vanamee has
control over his gift.
Vanamee1s special ability brings characters besides
Angele's daughter to him. The power intrigues Presley, who
asks about how it works (p. 30), and frightens Father
Sarria, who finds it disturbing that "my own will can count
for so little" (p. 102). Vance calls attention to the way
Norris realistically sets up Vanamee1s abilities: "strange
possibilities have been fully prepared for by scenes in
which Vanamee previously exercised his mysterious 'sixth
sense' by summoning Presley and Father Sarria on separate
48occasions, from a distance and from sleep." Once Vanamee 
has drawn these two to him, they greet him warmly, the 
surprise at being manipulated giving way to joy at seeing 
their friend. Since the power works so well on the living, 
Vanamee tries it on his dead Angele: "as if she were alive,
he summoned her to him" (p. 113). This initial attempt 
results in a vague answer, "a change--mysterious, illusive" 
(p. 115), but nevertheless an encouragement to Vanamee, who 
assumes Angele has responded. He enters into a ritual of
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nightly calling, believing "that his outstretched hands, 
groping in the darkness, met the touch of other fingers"
(p. 270)— fingers that belong to a necessarily physical 
apparition.
For Vanamee demands only the body of his beloved.
Their love is grounded in the physical? in the early days of 
their courtship, "mere words were useless between them. 
Silently, as his reaching hands touched her warm body, he 
took her in his arms, searching for her lips with his"
(p. 33). Granted, Norris writes romantically about their 
love, and Vanamee, and probably Angele, enjoy special 
communicative powers, but the wordlessness of their inter­
course only serves to define even more sharply the over­
riding sexual attraction between the two. Vanamee doesn't 
care to converse with or about Angele. He willingly 
comforts Presley with optimistic ideas about good triumphing 
over evil, but he refuses to describe Angele's return 
because "To put this story, this idyll, into words, would, 
for me, be a profanation" (p. 447).
Presley, to whom an inability to express oneself is 
like death (p. 36), imagines Vanamee's inner turmoil, made 
worse by the fact that "there were capabilities in Vanamee 
that were not ordinarily found in the rank and file of men. 
Living close to nature . . . there developed in him a great
sensitiveness to beauty and an almost abnormal capacity for 
great happiness and great sorrow" (p. 32). Vanamee's 
receptiveness to his surroundings enables him to persevere
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in his nightly summons when the answer on "some nights . . .
failed him entirely," or at best was "faint, illusive"
(p. 270). His sensitivity to the natural world draws him
away from others into "the reach of the desert and red hill,
the purple mountain, the level stretch of alkali, leper
white, all the savage, gorgeous desolation of the Long
49Trail" (p. 31). Vanamee1s way of life excites Presley,
who, visualizing his epic in Vanamee's recitation of his
travels, exclaims, "How I should have loved to have been
with you" (p. 35). It seems that Vanamee truly lives his
art, in accordance with Norris's conviction that "life is
50better than literature." Vanamee implies the superiority 
of experience over art when he asks Presley, "But why write? 
Why not live in it?" (p. 35). Vanamee certainly experiences 
a great deal in his travels, but his life, "living in the 
desert, in the wilderness, a recluse, a nomad, an ascetic"
(p. 34), completely excludes other people. Vanamee, as 
responsive and well-travelled as he is, does not "live" in 
the way Norris demands. He and Presley discuss life at 
cross-purposes. Presley, for all his sterile aestheticism, 
wants to write an epic that emphasizes the social environ­
ment, as well as the natural, "the strenuous, fierce life of 
isolated towns, . . . the song of the people" (p. 35).
Vanamee speaks primarily of nature, and aloneness in nature 
at that. Vanamee gets what he wants in the end, but Norris, 
instead of presenting Vanamee as a role model or a spokesman, 
ironically shows him a failure: one who, though glorified
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for his wide-ranging experiences, wrongly prefers a "life"
51of social isolation.
We have already examined the nature of Vanamee's 
commitment to Angele while she lived; his desire for her 
after her death illustrates an even stranger kind of love. 
Vanamee expresses a basically lustful desire for his 
beloved:
She comes to my imagination only as what she was, 
material, earthly, as I loved her. Imperfect you 
say? but that is as I saw her, and as I saw her, I 
loved her? . . .  I don't want her spiritualized, 
exalted, glorified, celestial. I want her.
(p. 105)
His feeling for her is desire for her body, the way she 
looked: "as I saw her, I loved her." Quite a few critics,
Vance among them, object to the facility with which Vanamee 
meets and falls in love with Angele's daughter: "She
[Angele's daughter] is not Angele's 'very self'? she is half 
Other. Moreover, she has been wooed through suspicious 
means by a man old enough to be her father. To ignore all
52this is to be satisfied with the cheapest sort of romance."
In fact, Vanamee confesses that he wants only her body, not 
her soul: "I would rather be unhappy in the memory of what
she actually was than be happy in the realization of her 
transformed, changed, made celestial" (p. 105). Norris, and 
Sarria, excuse Vanamee's desire on the grounds of malnutri­
tion and social isolation (p. 108) , but even after "he came 
to himself" (p. 108), and separates from Sarria, he suffers 
"a longing for Angele, for some object around which his
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great love could enfold itself" (p. 110). So much desire 
for the physical is rather like the attraction Annixter 
initially feels for Hilma, when "to his surprise he found 
himself thinking of her after he had gone to bed that night, 
and in the morning when he woke up he was bothered to know 
whether he had dreamed about Hilma*s fine white arms 
overnight" (p. 62). Vanamee's similar desire, for "her 
whole dear body giving itself into his embrace? her lips 
against his? her hands holding his head? drawing his face 
down to hers" (p. 114), constitutes the culmination of his 
love, whereas Annixter's yearnings mark the beginning. 
Vanamee's last scene celebrates the physical union between 
himself and the object he has found to fold himself around, 
Angele's daughter: "He ran forward to meet her and she held
out her arms to him. He caught her to him, and she, turning 
her face to his, kissed him on the mouth" (p. 449).
Vanamee's overwhelming need to experience "the sound of
her voice, the touch of her hand, the clasp of her dear
arms, real real" (p. 105) causes him to cast about for any
way he might possibly achieve this. Sarria quotes Scripture
to Vanamee, hoping to comfort him: "Thou fool, that which
thou sowest is not quickened, except it die: And that which
thou sowest, thou sowest, not the body that shall be, but
bare grain, . . .  It is sown a natural body? it is raised a
53spiritual body" (p. 106). Vanamee hears only the first 
part— that the body sown is not the body that shall be— and 
conveniently ignores the second— that the dead body shall be
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raised as a spiritual body, not as a physical one. He
verbally makes the link between Angele and the sown body
when telling Presley about the response he has sensed; "lost
in a reverie," Vanamee "just above a whisper murmured:
. . that which thou sowest is not quickened; except it
die" . . . and she— Angele . . . died1" (p. 155). When
Angele's daughter appears, he repeats the verse again,
including his own interpretation:
Why had he not had the knowledge of God? "Thou 
fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened, 
except it die." So the seed had died. So died 
Angele. "And that which thou sowest, thou sowest 
not that body that shall be, but bare grain, it 
may chance of wheat, or of some other grain." The 
wheat called forth from out [sic] the darkness, 
from out the grip of the earth, of the grave, from 
out corruption, [sic] rose triumphant into light 
and life. So Angele, so life, so also the resur­
rection of the dead. (p. 277)
Omitting the line "it is sown a natural body; it is raised a 
spiritual body," Vanamee comes up with a plausible metaphor. 
Angele is like a seed, dying, rotting, and corrupting the 
earth" (pp. 276-7), and her look-alike daughter represents 
the resurrection of the buried seed, the "life springing 
from her death— the pure, the unconquerable, coming forth 
from the defiled" (p. 277). Were Vanamee to leave it at 
that, to simply see the daughter obviously delivered of 
Angele and then live in unshakeable Christian faith, he 
might be a trustworthy spokesman for the book. Unfor­
tunately, his behavior afterward indicates an inadequate 
grip on the reality of love. As Don Graham points out, "the 
daughter is not the mother and there is something disturbing
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about Vanamee's willingness to accept the surrogate for the 
54real thing." Furthermore, neither are grains of wheat; 
they are individual women with identities quite separate.
But since all along he only wanted to regain the body of 
Angele, her daughter's appearance more than satisfies 
Vanamee. In his last scene, he celebrates the reality of 
"Angele in the flesh, vital, sane, material" (p. 448), 
secure in the knowledge that he has won "the simple honesty 
of a loving trusting heart" (p. 449)— heart, perhaps, but 
surely not soul.
Vanamee ends his first glimpse of Angele's daughter 
with a jubilant recitation of ICorinthians 15:55, "Oh death, 
where is thy sting? Oh grave, where is thy victory?"
(p. 277). Fully convinced that he has seen death vanquished, 
Vanamee feels little concern for the fact that the woman who 
appears is not the woman he has been calling. He also 
conveniently omits the lines leading up to his exaltant 
shout: "When the perishable puts on the imperishable, and
the mortal puts on immortality, then [and only then, I add] 
shall come to pass the saying that is written: Death is
swallowed up in victory" (ICor. 15:54). The appearance of 
Angele's daughter, mortal, perishable, signifies no victory? 
she is only another example of Vanamee's remarkable powers 
of will. His mind, packed with visions of those perplexing 
eyes and that three-cornered white forehead, wills that such 
a creature come, and she does. The "lesson" learned, that 
"Angele was not the symbol, but the proof of immortality"
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(p. 276) teaches nothing. Angele*s daughter is as mortal as
they come, and Vanamee wants her that way. There has been
no miracle here, no resurrection. Angele’s daughter came
from Angele, but she is not her. For Vanamee to accept her,
and then to link her emergence with that of the wheat,
demonstrates oblivion to death's finality.
Vanamee, confident in his doctrine of deathlessness,
preaches a comforting, believable sermon to Presley just
before they part. He renounces death, deeming it "only the
absence of life" (p. 447) and implores Presley not to "judge
the whole round of life by the mere segment you can see.
The whole is, in the end, perfect" (p. 448). Be that as it
may, it provides no satisfactory explanation for why almost
everyone else in the book suffers so. James K. Folsom
explains how worthless Vanamee's doctrine is to the people
dying around him:
In contrast to the death and supposed rebirth of 
Angele we have the killing of the sheep by the 
train, . . . the futile deaths of Osterman and
Harran Derrick and the insanity of Magnus Derrick, 
and the living death of life imprisonment for 
Dyke.j-c111 none of these cases does death bring 
life.
Folsom goes on to note the death of Hooven, and the subse­
quent death and ruin of his wife and daughter, and the death 
of Annixter which precipitates the death of his unborn 
child, a death completely opposite to the survival of 
Angele's child. Folsom concludes by saying that the 
"answer" then is not in Vanamee's blithe acceptance of a 
somewhat twisted Scripture reading, but in the demand for
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"social justice" seen in Mrs. Dyke's words and her grand-
5 6daughter's copybook. But Folsom, and other critics like
McElrath, who tend to put Vanamee above or below or somehow
outside of reality, thereby declaring his opinions "irrele-
57vant to the principal concerns of The Octopus," brush 
aside too quickly Vanamee's very tangible presence in The 
Octopus. Norris takes pains to give Vanamee a real person­
ality, responsibility for himself and others (men as well as 
sheep), and palpable influence on another important 
character. Vanamee touches too many other lives and has too 
great an introspective capacity to be considered "irrele­
vant." Nor are his final words meaningless? everyone likes 
to believe "that it is not evil, but good, that in the end 
remains" (p. 447). Still, this remark conveys little 
knowledge to its hearers. What is missing is the conviction
that each of us must contribute toward the good that will
5 8manifest itself in the larger view. For Vanamee to invest 
all his effort in calling up a reincarnation of Angele is 
for him to miss the point entirely; the largest view he 
cares to see is that of an Angele look-alike, untouched by 
years, ready to make love to him. Although Vanamee comes 
very much back in touch with the reality of his physical 
desire, he never quite matures enough to behave responsibly.
Presley also demonstrates emotional immaturity, prefer­
ring the easiest lifestyle he can maintain. Though cer­
tainly not Norris himself, Presley clearly speaks for the 
author through much of the novel. Introspective and obser­
42
vant as a writer must be, Presley articulates for himself 
the thoughts and feelings Norris must describe for the other 
characters. Authorial comments with regard to this character 
decrease; Presley demonstrates by his own thought and speech 
the strain between personal responsibility and external 
force. Norris tells us how Magnus and Annixter feel and 
thus has the opportunity to use phrases that seem at times 
to absolve them of their free will. Presley reveals his own 
feelings, and, like the dichotomy seen in the other 
characters, often ascribes his motivations and deeds to 
external forces.
Perhaps it is because Presley exposes his own innermost 
emotions that he appears so ineffectual and indecisive; his 
own anxiety about his faults naturally emphasizes them. But 
Presley's early characterization intimates a weakness far 
deeper than modest anxiety. Norris tells us right off that 
"Just want he wanted, Presley hardly knew" (p. 15). Artis­
tically, Presley demands of himself a work quite anti­
thetical to his personality. He, a man who finds the 
ranchers, "their lives, their ways, their marriages, deaths, 
bickerings" "odious . . . beyond words" (p. 10), wants to
create an epic that speaks with:
. . . the voice of an entire people . . . their
legends, their folklore, their fighting, their 
loves and their lusts, their blunt grim humor,
their stoicism under stress, their adventures,
. . . their direct, crude speech. (pp. 13-4)
The romance of the everyday that Norris demands in The
Responsibilities of the Novelist attracts Presley, but he
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cares so little for the ordinary mechanics of the working­
man's day that he hears only the drone and not the voice of 
the people whose story he wants to tell.
In his life, as in his art, Presley never decides which
path to take. He determines his behavior by appropriating
the theories of others more strongly opinionated than
himself. Described initially as "morally . . .  of that sort
who avoid evil through good taste, lack of decision and want
of opportunity" (p. 13), when Presley finally does act,
committing evil, it is only because he allows passionate
emotions to overrule refined inertia and the influence of
Caraher to create the opportunity. In fact, what Presley
thinks is largely determined by the company he keeps? as
Granville Hicks stresses, "Presley hovers on the edge of the
struggle, now repelled, now drawn in, and at last takes
59refuge in his mystical optimism." Before he arrives at 
the final borrowed theory, Presley has espoused the ideas of 
nearly every participant in the struggle. His earliest 
sympathies lie with "the poet," who is besieged by the 
credity of ordinary man and deflowered by a stultifying 
school system (p. 35). Then for a time he becomes united 
with the ranchers in "hatred of the railroad [that] shook 
him like a crisp and withered reed” (p. 218), compelled by 
Cedarquist to "a blind exasperation" at the "languid indif­
ference of the people" (p. 218) , thereby modifying his 
earlier detachment from the railroad and his first hope of a 
vital Western population. He retracts his initial disdain
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for Caraher, telling him "you are the only one of us all who
is right" (p. 377), only to see him later as "a plague spot
in the world of the ranchers" (p. 436). Presley even
believes the enemy, considering Shelgrim's rationalistic
drivel reasonable— "it rang with the clear reverberation of
trust" (p. 405). In summary, Presley willingly devotes
himself to the most interesting and "romantic" (not in
Norris's terms) idea available, and, as Vance says, "all
this vacillation (of which there is much more) only inten-
6 0sifies Presley's confusion about his role as a writer."
The confusion Presley struggles through to find his 
place as a literary man provides the best medium through 
which to examine his failure to understand reality. Because 
he relies on the written word to define his experience for 
him, Presley is sorely hampered when unable to find the 
right form to express his thoughts. The early pages are 
full of his search for the meat of his epic. He produces 
the short poem "The Toilers" after devoting himself solely 
to journal writing so as to avoid "suffocating" (p. 36) from 
lack of written expression. Yet what he writes brings no 
solution. No longer thinking as a poet, for whom beauty of 
expression alone can satisfy the criterion for great art, 
Presley uses his journal to rail "against injustice and 
oppression, . . . with not one sane suggestion as to remedy
or redress" (p. 218). He tries oral expression in the heat 
of inspiration, but he does not reach "the hearts of the 
audience"? instead, he talks "as he would have written"
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(p. 389). He tries various modes of expression, and in only 
one does he begin to succeed.
In "The Toilers," we see Presley at his finest. It 
does not detract from his success that his poem was 
"discussed, attacked, defended, eulogized, ridiculed . . .
parodied (p. 277), and finally "distorted so as to read as 
an advertisement for patented cereals and infant1s foods"
(p. 278). It did invigorate "the people," and that, for its 
kind of literature, is highest praise. He achieves even 
more through this poem by inspiring two ladies to start "a 
movement to send a whole shipload of wheat to the starving 
people in India" (p. 426). Though he "had no thought of 
fame" (p. 278) in the writing of "The Toilers," he finally 
turned the tables on failure, and, though unwittingly, 
inspired a beneficial deed. In this way, Presley demon­
strates possession of a gift that can change the seemingly 
inevitable course of the world. At the beginning he has no 
words to describe the wild notions in his b r a i n . L a t e r ,  
when he finally grasps what he needs to express in "The 
Toilers," he succeeds in affecting his environment. When he 
laments in his journal the impotence of mankind, and "our 
little struggles, our moment's convulsion of death agony 
[that] causes not one jar in the vast, clashing machinery of 
the nation's life? . . . the momentary creak of the axle is
the mother's wail of bereavement, the wife's cry of 
anguish— and the great wheel turns" (p. 379). Were Presley 
able to continue to channel his anger in such a way, he
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might more often inspire others.
Angered because the railroad suppresses the rancher's
side of the story, Presley echoes Shelgrim, declaring that
no one can stop the tide of improbability that the newspaper
story will start, just as no one can stop the railroad and
its injustice:
Tell them [the people], five years from now the 
story of the fight between the league of the San 
Joaquin and the railroad and it will not be 
believed. What! a pitched battle between farmer 
and Railroad, a battle that cost the lives of
seven men? Impossible, it could not have
happened. Your story is fiction— exaggerated.
(p. 379)
Presley, as the only character in the book given the ability 
to express himself in prose, has the responsibility to make 
known the story and to make it believable. "The Toilers" 
demonstrated his skill at writing to move people; even his 
speech at the League meeting, though impersonal, holds the 
attention of its listeners. The writers are the ones who 
must insure that the great wheel i^ disturbed, that the 
mother's wail ^s heard, and that these things make a differ­
ence. It is too easy to blame everything on forces and 
chance. Norris might seem to endorse such influences, but 
at the same time he endows all his characters, including
Presley, with specific skills that can alter the progress of
6 2"pre-determined" forces. Presley could help others by 
distributing information from his journals in layman's 
terms; he simply chooses not to.
After Presley decides he cannot help anything by 
writing, especially in view of the fact that "the story of
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the fight, the story creating the first impression, was to 
be told to San Francisco and the outside world by S. Behrman, 
Ruggles, and the P. and S. W. agents" (p. 381), he chooses 
to aid the cause by throwing a bomb through S. Behrman's 
window. He realizes later that this course of action was 
wrong, but yet he still does not resolve to help set to 
rights the situation that so infuriated him. Instead, he 
leaves "Bonneville and the sight of the ruin there" (p. 396). 
Presley bears the responsibility to make people aware of the 
evils that have been done, not merely to whine about them or 
to scribble them down in a notebook for none but himself to 
see. All the nonsense about deterministic forces might be 
comforting, but the responsibility to disseminate the truth 
falls directly upon the shoulders of the individual.
The same strain— between force and will— exists in the 
treatment of Presley's character as that of the other 
characters, only that, as mentioned before, Presley intro­
duces external forces himself, thus relieving Norris^of the 
task. Presley likes very much to lose touch with his 
intellectual side. As romantic as Vanamee, but lacking in 
the same responsive powers, Presley rarely communes with the 
natural world. Occasionally, as in his reverie on the 
mountain's summit, he gives himself up to his environment: 
"the sense of his own personality became blunted, the little 
wheels and cogs of thought moved slower and slower? con­
sciousness dwindled to a point, the animal in him stretched 
itself" (p. 37). The experience continues as Presley seems
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to become a force himself, "to dominate a universe, a whole 
order of things" (p. 39). Of course, this power is abruptly 
removed by the intrusion of brutal reality— the death of the 
sheep on the tracks— and Presley comes crashing down from 
the "sudden uplift" (p. 39) of the Muse. As much as Presley 
wishes to remain aloof from the real troubles of the world, 
either through a union with nature, or by rebelling against 
the mechanism of the railroad, the pressing circumstances of 
reality draw him down to earth. He even realizes for a 
short while that he might help his friends of he were to 
"range the entire nation, telling all his countrymen of the 
drama that was working itself out on this fringe of the 
continent, . . . rousing their interest and stirring them up
to action" (p. 278). Presley never manages to dedicate 
himself in this way, allowing instead the "other affairs 
near at hand . . .  to absorb his attention" (p. 278).
Before Presley goes away, he decides to find and help 
Minna Hooven. Upon discovering her after she has become a 
prostitute, he chastises himself, imagining "that he was, in 
a manner, marked; that he was foredoomed to fail" (p. 44). 
Filled with inward loathing at his inability to act, he 
seeks to blame a "mesh" similar to that which Norris ascribed 
to Magnus. Presley, of course, is not "foredoomed to fail," 
but rather allows the weaknesses in his personality to 
triumph over the strengths. In the case of Minna, whose 
decay brings Presley to the preceding rationalization, his 
arrival after the fact need not keep him from aiding her.
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In fact, as he tells Mrs. Gerard later, "One need never be 
afraid of being too late in the matter of helping the 
destitute” (p. 426). Granted mores were different in the 
1900*s, but a "fallen woman" could at least be made more 
comfortable financially even if she could not be restored to 
social respectability. Presley's willingness to give up, 
and his uneconomical self-abasement for being a coward and a 
loser, has no practical application at all.
Presley blames what he considers his failure on pre­
vailing natural forces. By the end of the novel, Presley 
has found so many powerful external forces to blame that he 
goes off to India scot-free. Norris, and Presley, have 
moved from a virtually autonomous human existence, wherein 
"natural forces seem to hang suspended [and] . . . the very
stubble had no force even to rot" (p. 16), to a universe 
where "FORCE only existed" (p. 446), and he is blameless.
It is all very well for Presley to believe that individual 
men cannot alter the course of the world, but then neither 
can he say that good or bad will win out, because forces 
know no good or bad. After Lyman betrays the league,
Presley muses about man's ineffectiveness as compared to the 
force of the wheat, resigning himself and others to unimpor­
tance before its greatness:
Indifferent, gigantic, resistless, it moved in its 
appointed grooves. Men, Lilliputians, gnats in 
the sunshine, buzzing in their tiny battles were 
born, lived through their little day, died and 
were forgotten? while the wheat, wrapped in 
nirvanic calm, grew steadily under the night.
(p. 316)
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The visit to Shelgrim confirms Presley's belief in nature's
culpability. Fully convinced by the ogre in the skullcap,
Presley leaves the office even surer that nature is to
blame, or at least partially contributes to life's horrors:
Forces, conditions, laws of supply and
demand— were these, then, the enemies after all?
Not enemies; there was no malevolence in nature. 
Colossal indifference only, a vast trend toward 
appointed goals. Nature was, then, a gigantic 
engine, a vast cyclopean power, huge, terrible, a 
leviathan with a heart of steel. (p. 406)
These words of despair are not much different than those he
uses to describe the railroad early in the novel after it
kills the sheep (p. 42), nor are they a development from
Mrs. Derrick's realization that nature turns hostile if men
6 3are not submissive to its force. All are simply rational­
izations developed by the characters to extricate themselves 
from blame, and employed by Norris to demonstrate the 
rejection of responsibility.
Both Presley and Mrs. Derrick leave Los Muertos, but 
Mrs. Derrick, "listless, apathetic [and] calm" as she is 
(p. 437), at least goes with the knowledge that she will be 
responsible for the welfare of another as well as for 
herself. Presley just sort of goes, barely responsible for 
himself much less for anyone else. His encounter with 
Hilma, in which he resolves "to be strong and noble because 
of her" (p. 443), might be construed as an awareness of the 
possibilities of his life, but his advice to her on even­
tually becoming "more noble, a truer woman, more generous" 
(p. 443) is hypocritical when viewed in conjunction with the
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creed Presley upholds. At the time, Presley is sure that he 
will change for Hilma. Don Graham describes his transforma­
tion as "a genuine conversion of the heart, sparked by 
emotion and corroborated by intellect," adding later that
this is "not one of his characteristically impulsive 
64responses." He links Presley*s dedication to Hilma with 
Annixter*s, but such a correspondence seems unlikely. First 
of all, in both Vanamee’s and Annixter*s revelations of 
love, many steps and much soul searching is required.
Presley has spent quite a bit of time examining his reaction 
to the world*s force, but comparatively little in thinking 
about Hilma. Norris might better have prepared for a union 
between Presley and Hilma than by adding "without realizing 
it, he had been from the first drawn to Hilma, and all 
through these last terrible days, . . . she had obtruded
continually upon his thoughts" (p. 443). We have been 
included "continually" in Presley’s thoughts "all through 
these last terrible days" and Presley hasn’t given a thought 
to Hilma. Also, Presley has given us no indication up to 
this point that he ever sticks with a particular theory, and 
just because it*s the end of the book, there is no guarantee 
that he’ll stick this one out either.
Presley sails away to India, preferring the delusion 
that forces dominate all, and men— -"motes in the sunshine" 
(p. 457)— nothing. The basic tenets of his personality have 
not changed at all. In characterizing Presley, one sees 
immediately that he does not know what he really wants in
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art or in life. Presley is torn between "his ambition to 
portray life as he was it— directly, frankly, and through no 
medium of personality or temperament" (p. 15) and his desire 
"to see everything through a rose-colored mist— a mist that 
dulled all harsh outlines, all crude and violent colors"
(p. 15). He wants life to be like the landscape he surveys; 
for "everything in the range of his vision . . . [to be]
overlaid with a sheen of gold" (p. 38). Certainly he will 
portray the truth; but only if, as he wishes, his truth be 
sweet. How much easier for him to absent himself from the 
ugliness of Bonneville, fortified by a doubtful, hesitant 
assertion that "all things surely, inevitably, resistlessly 
work together for good" (p. 458). But "things" don't work 
for good; men do. Saving a thousand lives in a "far-distant 
corner of the world" (p. 458) doesn't make Annixter’s death 
any easier to bear. And falseness, injustice, and oppres­
sion do not just die, or fade away, or vanish by themselves 
(p. 458). Warren French reminds us that "the forces at work 
are not necessarily uncontrollable (Marchand points out that 
'the growing of wheat is not a cosmic process, but a purely
human activity'), but they cannot be controlled by the
6 5characters Norris has created." Presley's love of the 
"rose-colored mist" is not an instinct, nor a result of some 
pre-determined fate, but a weakness in his personality put 
there by Norris, Presley must learn to overcome his irre­
sponsibility or settle, as he does, for failure.
The "straight naturalism" of McTeague is not present in
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The Octopus. Even though Norris may have intended to 
portray man as a victim of the determining natural forces so 
strong in McTeague, in The Octopus, as Hicks writes, still 
"he wavers between the view that his [man's] surrender is 
ignoble and the view that it is inevitable. In the end, 
the see-saw tips down in favor of the ignobility of man's 
surrender? natural„.forces do not determine his life, but 
jtterely affect it as does a traffic jam or an illness.
Norris develops a separate identity for each character in 
The Octopus, and though he intrudes with conflicting external 
forces, he basically demands that each do right within his 
personal standards. The delusions, hallucinations, illu­
sions, misjudgments, and indecisiveness demonstrated by each 
character come from within. Norris takes care to create 
characters sufficiently equipped morally to overcome initial 
faults. In no circumstance can a character in The Octopus 
say, as Trina can in McTeague, "It's stronger than I"
(p. 164) , though some try to ignore reality and avoid blame 
for their behavior and its results.
Norris uses none of his characters as actual spokesmen
for the philosophy behind The Octopus, choosing instead to
systematically undercut the apparent solutions the more
vocal characters offer. Joseph McElrath discounts the words
of the characters appearing at the end, stating that in no
way could Norris "sanction Shelgrim's, Vanamee's or Presley's
6 7facile answers to the questions raised by the plot."
Shelgrim conveniently attributes all wrong to external
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agencies: "the wheat is one force, the railroad another,
and there is the law that governs them— supply and demand"
(p. 405). He lumps all external forces together as culpable, 
and he depends upon them to make his excuses and his fortune. 
Vanamee proclaims "good"— nobility, love, sacrifice, gener­
osity, truth (p. 447)— eternal, and "the whole round of 
life . . . perfect" (p. 448), but he demonstrates none of 
these "good" qualities in his relationship with Angele’s 
daughter, nor does he actively contribute to life in any way 
that benefits any but himself. Neither is Presley Norris’s 
spokesman; he only increases the deterministic pall by his 
belief that "forces rather than men had locked horns in that 
struggle" (p. 457). Norris undermines his influence at the 
end of the novel by allowing him, as before, to change his 
mind several more times about his philosophical sympathies, 
and, more importantly, to go away from his problems instead 
of facing them. Nor does Dyke’s response to trouble, to 
descend into instinctual behavior utterly without human 
will, represent Norris's viewpoint. Dyke's end parallels 
the conventional naturalism of McTeague, but before he 
blames the railroad as a general force, "a certain feeling 
of shame" (p. 249) reminds him of his own guilt. Unlike 
McTeague, who bewilderedly submits to a fate he neither 
understands nor controls, Dyke knows for a few moments that 
his own decisions caused his ruin.
According to George W. Meyer, Norris expects Shelgrim, 
the other characters, and the reader to "understand and then
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6 8adjust himself to her [nature's] changeless laws," thus
insuring "a society soundly based on potent nature and her
69perdurable laws." Such an interpretation essentially
proclaims the power of instinct, heredity and environment so
prevalent in McTeague, but undercut by Norris in The Octopus.
In McTeague, Norris presents a character who adjusts himself
to nature's demands, eventually fleeing like a hunted animal
across a desert wilderness. Such behavior indicates no
human progress. In The Octopus, man-made forces— the mob,
the railroad trust, the economy, the press— make up the
forces that primarily affect man, though Norris also invokes
natural and intangible forces as well. It seems, then, as
McElrath explains, that neither nature, nor mankind offers a
solution acceptable to Norris:
. . . it seems his intention to establish the fact
that there is no immediate solution to the problem 
of inhumaneness in the economic order . . . .  but, 
regarding specific and immediately effective 
remedies for the socioeconomic disaster in the San 
Joaquin Va^Jey, Norris does not know how to 
prescribe.
Norris tends to embrace whatever idea fits best metaphor-
71ically rather than literally, but since he's a novelist 
and not an economist in this case we don't expect a program 
to recover economic health, but rather a philosophy by which 
to conduct life.
Does Norris then never supply an answer? According to 
Walcutt, no, because he never reconciles the contradiction 
between fate and will. Walcutt does not think that Norris 
solves the problem he poses:
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We are told that how the wheat is distributed does 
not matter; we are almost persuaded that the 
manner of its distribution is a part of nature's 
larger plan . . . .  The problem of how people 
should react to injustice is simply evaded, while 
a vaguely religious affirmation of ultimate good 
is offered to appease the emotions aroused by the 
action.
Norris does solve the problem, and by following the guide­
lines outlined in "The Novel with a 'Purpose,'" his solution 
becomes clear. Briefly, The Octopus satisfies the three
criteria Norris deems essential in the "best class" of
73novels: it tells, shows, and proves something. It
achieves these goals through the use of "elemental forces
[that] contribute to the novel with a purpose to provide it
74with vigorous action." The purpose of these forces is
75simply to clarify "the motives that stir whole nations;"
to make the reader understand, not to demonstrate cruelty.
Additionally, events of the story must do "the preaching,
7 6the moralizing," not the author, nor dares the writer
77become "really and vitally interested in the purpose" lest
his novel fail. Finally, "the purpose novel always ends
unhappily," as The Octopus does, because "there is much pain
in [real] life," and the purpose novel "is a sincere tran-
7 8scription of life."
Granted, the fuzzy approach to natural forces clouds 
the matter. One can select passages in The Octopus to 
support man-made and natural forces as good, as bad, as 
indifferent, or as vindictive. James K. Folsom reconciles 
the variance, emphasizing as I have the importance of 
perception:
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Whether nature is friendly or inimical depends 
upon ourselves. If we choose to ignore or wilfully 
to misunderstand the duality at the heart of 
things, the side of life we deny will inevitably 
become hostile. Norris makes the point in The 
Octopus as in^cTeague that what we don't know 
will hurt us.
Folsom sides with characters like Mrs. Derrick and Presley,
who, on several occasions, rage at nature's deliberate
malevolence toward men who cross her. He points out that
man needs to be aware of reality; otherwise he will suffer.
However, what McTeague and Trina don't know cannot hurt or
help them. Norris has not created in McTeague characters
who think and act the way characters in The Octopus do. Nor
has he allowed the lives of characters in The Octopus to be
dominated by natural, man-made, or instinctual force as in
McTeague. McTeague never can know himself, but Annixter,
Magnus and Annie do, and, were they so inclined, Presley and
Vanamee might as well. Norris presents several hopeful ways
of perceiving an apparently hopeless situation in The
Octopus, "fearlessly proving that power is abused, that the
strong grind the faces of the weak, that an evil tree is
still growing in the midst of the garden, that undoing
follows hard upon unrighteousness," but most importantly,
"that the races of men have yet to work out their destiny in
those great and terrible movements that crush and grind and
80rend asunder the pillars of the houses of the nations."
Men must "work out" their problems themselves. To prefer 
the "truth" of naturalistic determinism is to relinquish 
one's freedom, and though Norris looks longingly at such a
58
solution, in the end, and almost despite himself, The 
Octopus comes down on the side of free will.
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